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TRAVELLING DOWN THE UNSTEADY PATH:
UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ,
NEW YORK v. UNITED STATES,
AND THE TENTH AMENDMENT
Anthony B. Ching*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Lopez,'
invalidating a federal law criminalizing the possession of a firearm by
an individual in a school zone,2 coupled with the Court's 1992
decision in New York v. United States,3 has given new hope to states
in their pursuit of judicial relief based on the Tenth Amendment.4
Lopez and New York, however, are only two in a long line of
decisions concerning the Tenth Amendment. Any discussion of the
Tenth Amendment must be made against the backdrop of nearly 200
years of Tenth Amendment jurisprudence which is an inseparable part
of our constitutional history. This Article examines the evolution of
the Tenth Amendment jurisprudence of which Lopez and New York
are the Court's most recent pronouncements
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for their encouragement and guidance. I also thank my sons, Alexander Ching and
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the State of Arizona.
1. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1994).
3. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
4. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
U.S. CONsT. amend. X.
5. The Court in New York acknowledged that its recent case law interpreting the 10th
Amendment "has traveled an unsteady path." 112 S. Ct. at 2420. This characterization
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Since the Constitution gives Congress the power to legislate,6
tension often arises from federal legislation that conflicts with state
powers. These laws are generally enacted either under the enumerat-
ed powers in the Constitution7 or pursuant to the Civil War Amend-
ments.' The enumerated powers most frequently used by Congress,
which occasion conflicts with the state powers, are the Commerce
Clause9 and the Spending Clause.t" In addition, state laws which
infringe on federal constitutional powers are invalid under the
Supremacy Clause."
Although most of the enumerated powers are found in Article I,
Section 8 of the Constitution, congressional legislation under other
provisions in the Constitution also creates conflicts with state powers.
State laws and policies have been invalidated where they conflicted
with congressional legislation implementing treaties, 2 when they
interfered with the federal executive 3 or judicial power, 4 or intrud-
ed into areas exclusively within the federal domain.'" The Tenth
applies equally to the entire history of 10th Amendment jurisprudence.
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in
a Congress of the United States ...
7. Id. § 8.
8. Id. amends. XIII, XIV, XV.
9. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
10. Id. cl. 1 ("The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general
Welfare of th6 United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States.. . ."). This language gives Congress the power to tax and
spend the money collected from the taxes for the stated purposes.
11. Id. art. VI, § 2.
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Id.
12. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (holding congressional legislation
pursuant to a treaty overrides state's title to migratory birds).
13. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937) (holding that executive agreement
between the President and another nation overrides state policy).
14. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 303 (1816) (holding that the
Supreme Court has the constitutional power to review state court decisions). But see
Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) ("[T"]he federal courts in devising a remedy must
take into account the interests of the state and local authorities in managing their own
affairs, consistent with the Constitution.").
15. United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995) (invalidating
state imposed term limits on the election of United States senators and representatives);
Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (holding that state law restricting rights of certain
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Amendment is also considered inapplicable in cases where Congress
exercises its Property Clause powers. 6 On a few occasions the
Court has declined to reach the merits of such controversy based on
the political question doctrine. 7
In addition to a discussion of the Lopez decision, this Article
offers a critique of the New York decision. In a broad review this
Article will discuss Tenth Amendment jurisprudence under the
Commerce Clause,1" the Spending Clause, 9 and the Civil War
Amendments.20 This Article is intended to inform readers concern-
ing the evolution of Tenth Amendment jurisprudence and put in
context today's controversy surrounding conflicts between federal and
state power. It is not intended to suggest or espouse a particular
constitutional theory advancing states' rights. Tenth Amendment
jurisprudence concerns the fundamental structure of our federal
system of government and has evolved due to changes in the Supreme
Court's political philosophy of government." That philosophy,
invariably, is influenced by changing political, social, and economic
forces over the past two centuries?' Undoubtedly, these same
internal and global forces will continue to shape the development of
this jurisprudence.
nonresident aliens to inherit property intruded on foreign policy power of federal
government).
16. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2; see also Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297
U.S. 288, 330 (1936).
17. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447,484-85 (1923); Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S.
(6 Wall.) 50, 54 (1867); see also CHRISTOPHER MAY, IN THE NAME OF WAR: JUDICIAL
REVIEW AND THE WAR POWERS SINCE 1918, at 24-25 (1989).
18. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
19. Id. cl. 1.
20. Id. amends. XIII, XIV, XV. Congressional enactments affecting states' rights are
sometimes based on the exercise of both the Commerce Clause and Spending Clause
powers. Civil Rights legislation may be based on the Civil War amendments, the
Commerce Clause, and the Spending Clause. Therefore, although this Article will discuss
each area separately, the cases discussed may not necessarily be confined to the separate
headings.
21. CHRISTOPHER TIEDEMAN, THE UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY INTO THE FUNDAMENTALS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 43-45 (1974) (1st ed. 1890).
22. See id. at 49-50; Stephen A. Siegal, Hstorium in Late Nineteenth-Century
Constitutional Thought, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1431, 1539.
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II. THE TENTH AMENDMENT AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
A. Historical Perspective
The United States Constitution was a product of compromise
between two conflicting interests: the need to join together to form
a strong national government and the need to protect sovereign
interests of the states which formed the national government.'
The compromise resulted in a Constitution which created a
national government with enumerated powers. The Tenth Amend-,
ment is one of the ten amendments in the Bill of Rights proposed by
the First Congress and ratified by the states.24 The Tenth Amend-
ment was incorporated into the Bill of Rights because of the
Anti-Federalist's concern that the Constitution would make the
national government too powerful and could ultimately eliminate state
sovereignty.' The Federalists eventually conceded that such a
provision was necessary and agreed that a Bill of Rights, including the
version which is now the Tenth Amendment, would be proposed in
the First Congress.26 The Tenth Amendment, therefore, specified
that the powers of government, except for those enumerated in the
Constitution as belonging to the national government, belong to the
states and the people that formed the Union.27
23. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 6, 17 (Alexander Hamilton), No. 14 (James Madison).
24. Twelve amendments were originally proposed. The two amendments which were
not ratified concerned the size of the House of Representatives and prohibited members
of Congress from raising their own salaries. George Anastaplo, Amendments to the
Constitution of the United States: A Commentary, 23 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 631, 687 (1992).
The latter of the two amendments was finally ratified in 1992, more than 200 years later.
It is now the 27th Amendment. Unlike later constitutional amendments proposed by
Congress, the Bill of Rights did not contain a time period for ratification. JETHRO K.
LIEBERMAN, THE EVOLVING CONSTITUTION 75-76 (1992).
25. See generally 1-4 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. Philadelphia, J.B.
Lippincott Co. 1836) (expressing concern over too strong a federal government).
However, the Supreme Court has rejected the suggestion "that the States and the Federal
Government in all circumstances must be viewed as coequal sovereigns." FERC v.
Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 761 (1982).
26. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 505,
passim (1971). 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 432-37 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (remarks of
James Madison).
27. United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842,1856 (1995) (holding,
by a five member majority, that the Constitution's silence on a subject does not necessarily
mean that it falls within the reserved powers of the states).
November 1995] TRAVELLING DOWN THE UNSTEADY PATH 103
The evolution of Tenth Amendment jurisprudence is inter-
twined with the interpretation of the constitutional provisions
affecting the very fabric of the Union. It is a necessary part of the
unavoidable conflicts between the states and the national government
created by the Constitution. Tenth Amendment jurisprudence,
therefore, developed in the course of the Supreme Court's resolution
of these conflicts. Since much of the early expansion of the national
government's powers dealt with the Commerce Clause, which
delegated to the national government broad power to regulate
commerce among the several states, the evolution of Commerce
Clause jurisprudence is, in many ways, the evolution of Tenth
Amendment jurisprudence.
1. McCulloch v. Maryland
The first confrontation between national and state power in the
regulation of commerce came in McCulloch v. Maryland.
McCulloch concerned a tax imposed by Maryland on the operation of
the Baltimore branch of the Bank of the United States.29 In an
opinion by Chief Justice Marshall, a unanimous Supreme Court
declared Maryland's law unconstitutional under .the Supremacy
Clause." The Court rejected Maryland's argument that the creation
of a national bank was not among the enumerated powers in the
Constitution and thus, it was beyond Congress's powers.31 The
Court held that enumerated powers in the Constitution, such as the
power to "lay and collect [t]axes,"3 2 "borrow money, 3 3 "regulate
[c]ommerce,"'  "declare [w]ar, '. 3. "raise and support [a]rmies,
36
and "maintain a [n]avy,, 37 implied the grant of power to create a
national bank.38 The Court refused to construe the Necessary and
Proper Clause39 narrowly to mean only those measures absolutely
28. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
29. Id. at 317-21.
30. Id. at 424.
31. Id. at 421.
32. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
33. Id. cl. 2.
34. Id. cl. 3.
35. Id. cl. 11.
36. Id. cl. 12.
37. Id. cl. 13.
38. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 418.
39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 ("The Congress shall have Power... [t]o make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
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necessary to carry out the enumerated powers. Instead, the Court
broadly interpreted that language and said, "Let the end be legiti-
mate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means
which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which
are not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the
constitution, are constitutional. '4' After concluding that Congress
had the power to create a national bank, the Court found that
Maryland's tax infringed upon that congressional power.4
McCulloch was a victory for the Federalists. Marshall's opinion
squarely rejected Thomas Jefferson's advice to President Washington
opposing the creation of the First Bank by Congress, which President
Washington signed into law in 1791.42 Jefferson, in his capacity as
Secretary of State, forcefully argued that none of the enumerated
powers in the Constitution authorized or required the establishment
of a national bank.43
Five years after McCulloch the Court decided Gibbons v.
Ogden,' another landmark case in the expansion of the national
power. Gibbons involved New York's grant of an exclusive license to
certain ships for navigation between New Jersey and New York.45
This grant came into conflict with the federal law licensing ships to
ply the coastal trade.' Chief Justice Marshall's opinion held that
states may regulate their internal commerce, but if the state laws were
in conflict with congressional legislation enacted under the Commerce
Clause, federal law must govern.47 Accordingly, congressional
legislation licensing the ships governed over New York licensing
laws."
Marshall, however, rejected the broad argument that "power to
regulate a particular subject, implies the whole power, and leaves no
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.").
40. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421.
41. il. at 425-26.
42. Congress did not renew the Charter of the First Bank and it expired in 1811. The
Second Bank was chartered in 1816.
43. 5 THE WRmTNGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 285-89 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1895).
44. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
45. Id. at 186.
46. Id. at 210.
47. Id. at 211.
48. Id. at 212.
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residuum; that a grant of the whole is incompatible with the existence
of a right in another to any part of it."'49
Justice William Johnson, the first appointee to the Court by
President Jefferson and a supporter of Marshall in McCulloch, wrote
a separate opinion expressing the view that the Commerce Clause
deprived the states of any power to regulate commerce.0 Johnson
concluded that even if there had not been any congressional legisla-
tion licensing such ships in coastal trade, the states still could not
interfere with the shipping activities.
5'
2. Taney's views on states' role in regulating commerce
The balance of federal power versus state power, in the context
of the Commerce Clause, shifted after Roger Taney became Chief
Justice in 1836. Justice William Johnson's view, that the national
power to regulate commerce is absolute, was all but forgotten. In the
License Cases,52 sustaining state regulation of the sale of liquor
brought from another state, Taney explained,
the State may nevertheless, for the safety or convenience of
trade, or for the protection of the health of its citizens, make
regulations of commerce for its own ports and harbours, and
for its own territory; and such regulations are valid unless
they come into conflict with a law of Congress.53
A few years later in Cooley v. Board of Wardens,' the Court distin-
guished Gibbons5 and upheld Pennsylvania's pilotage fee for ships
entering Pennsylvania ports.
56
49. Id. at 198. Justice Marshall's broad interpretation of the Commerce Clause was
counterbalanced by his interpretation of the reach of the Bill of Rights. In Barron v.
Mayor and City Council, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), Marshall gave short shrift to the
argument that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment-unlike the First
Amendment which refers specifically to lawmaking by Congress, the Fourth, Fifth, and
Sixth Amendments provide generally for the protection of certain rights-applied to the
States and their political subdivisions. The Court thought that the answer was so obvious
that it stopped the defendants' argument. Id. at 247. Roger Taney, who later succeeded
Marshall as Chief Justice, appeared as counsel for defendants. I.
50. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 222 (Johnson, J., concurring in the result, but not
in the reasoning).
51. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 237.
52. 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847).
53. Id. at 579.
54. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
55. Id. at 309-10.
56. Id. at 320. In Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1861), overruled by
Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219 (1987), a case unrelated to the Commerce Clause,
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3. The next seventy years
Commerce Clause jurisprudence for the next seventy years
consisted of a series of seemingly inconsistent doctrinal pronounce-
ments by the Supreme Court. The Court attempted to resolve the
conflict between the need to give recognition to the Constitution's
grant of power over commerce to the federal government, and the
states' desire to protect their people under state police power by
regulating commerce. The decisions from that era range from a
declaration that national Commerce Clause power was "exclusive"
57
to cases narrowly construing commerce as to not include manufactur-
ing5 8 and insurance.
59
On the other hand, state laws that evinced economic protection-
ism were struck down as burdening commerce under the "negative"
or "dormant" Commerce Clause.6°
4. Hammer v. Dagenhart and states' rights
The judicial philosophy in favor of states' rights, which coincided
with the protection of private property rights, reached its peak in
Hammer v. Dagenhart.61 The Court in Hammer struck down a
congressional enactment prohibiting the interstate transportation of
goods manufactured by child labor.62 Justice Day's majority opinion
concluded that
[t]he grant of power to Congress over the subject of
interstate commerce was to enable it to regulate such
commerce, and not to give it authority to control the states
Chief Justice Taney held that neither the federal court nor any other department could use
any coercive means to compel the states to comply with the Extradition Clause. Id. at 107.
57. Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485, 488-90 (1877) (applying the Commerce Clause to
strike down Louisiana's public accommodation law as it applied to river boat passengers
travelling to states whose laws required racial segregation). But see The Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (holding that Congress has no power to enact a public
accommodation statute).
58. See Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20 (1922) (invalidating a federal tax on the
profits of businesses employing child labor); Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 26 (1888)
(holding the manufacture of alcoholic beverages for sale out of state is not commerce).
59. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868) (issuing a policy that insurance is not
a transaction in commerce). But see United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n,
322 U.S. 533 (1944) (holding that insurance business is within congressional power to
regulate commerce under the Sherman Antitrust Act).
60. See, e.g., Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1875).
61. 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
62. Id. at 276.
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in their exercise of the police power over local trade and
manufacture.
The grant of authority over a purely federal matter was
not intended to destroy the local power always existing and
carefully reserved to the States in the Tenth Amendment to
the Constitution.'
Hammer put the brake on the expansion of Congress's Com-
merce Clause power. In that respect it stood as the zenith of states'
rights and, correspondingly, private property rights to be free from
federal government regulation.
After the Great Depression of the late 1920s and early 1930s,
with the election of Franklin Delano Roosevelt as President in 1932,
Congress embarked on a flurry of legislation to remedy the economic
and social ills of the nation. In response to challenges to these
laws,' the Court struck down several enactments on constitutional
grounds. Although some of these decisions were grounded on the
Due Process Clause, a number of them were based wholly, or in part,
on the Tenth Amendment. Three cases decided in that period
deserve brief discussion: Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,' and Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton
Railroad Co.67
In Schechter the Court struck down the minimum hour and wage
provisions of the Live Poultry Code.' The Court held that wages
and hours of the employees of a New York slaughterhouse, whose
poultry came to New York in interstate commerce, and the in-state
sale of the poultry, were internal concerns of a state to be regulated
by the state and not the federal government.69
63. Id. at 273-74.
64. These challenges were brought by businesses which were adversely impacted by
the legislation.
65. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
66. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
67. 295 U.S. 330 (1935).
68. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 550. The Live Poultry Code was adopted pursuant to the
National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, ch. 90, § 3, 48 Stat. 195.
69. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 550. One year later the Court struck down New York
legislation regulating minimum wages for women as a violation of the Due Process Clause
of the 14th Amendment. Morehead v. New York ex reL Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
The Morehead decision relied on Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923), which
struck down a congressional act prescribing minimum wages for women and children in
the District of Columbia. Morehead, 298 U.S. at 603. This line of cases shows that the
judicial philosophy in that era favored private property rights over federal and states'
rights to regulate. The application of the Due Process Clause to minimum wage legislation
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Carter Coal, decided a year after Schechter, concerned the
Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 (Guffey Coal Act)," an
enactment that taxed the sale of coal but permitted a tax reduction if
the coal company agreed to wage and hour regulation for its
workers.71 A five-to-four majority of the Court found that the tax
could not be upheld as a valid exercise of Congress's taxing power
because it was not a tax but a penalty.72 Further, the Court held
that mining, like manufacturing, was not commerce. 73  Moreover,
since Congress has no general power to regulate for the general
welfare, the Guffey Coal Act was unconstitutional.74
In Railroad Retirement Board,75 a case decided the same year as
Schechter, the court was confronted with the expansion of federal
regulation of an industry which is unquestionably subject to congres-
sional regulation under the Interstate Commerce Act 6 Nonetheless,
a five-to-four majority invalidated the Railroad Retirement Act of
1934," which established a compulsory pension scheme for railroad
workers. 78  In response to the government's argument that an
assured pension improved the morale of the employees and promoted
efficiency of the railroads which were legitimate purposes within
Congress's Commerce Clause power, Justice Roberts, who authored
the majority opinion, answered:
was finally discarded by the Court in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
Justice Roberts's change of position from his earlier vote in Morehead, creating the new
majority in Parrish, was characterized by some as "a switch in time which saved nine" in
response to the "court packing plan" submitted by President Roosevelt to Congress on
February 7, 1937. William E. Leuchtenburg, FDR's Court-Packing Plan: A Second Life,
A Second Death, 1985 DUKE L.J. 673, 673. However, Justice Roberts asserted that his
change of position predated the court packing plan. See Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice
Roberts, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 311, 314 (1955).
70. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 288-89 (invalidating Bituminous Coal Conservation Act
of 1935, ch. 824, §§ 1-23, 49 Stat. 991, repealed by Bituminous Coal Act of 1937, ch. 127,
§ 20, 50 Stat. 72, 90, repealed by Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub L. No. 89-554, § 8(a), 80 Stat.
649, 651).
71. Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935, § 3, 49 Stat. at 993-94.
72. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 288-89.
73. Id. at 310.
74. Id. at 292.
75. 295 U.S. 330 (1935).
76. Id. at 336.
77. Railroad Retirement Bd., 295 U.S. at 374 (invalidating Railroad Retirement Act of
1934, ch. 868, §§ 1-14, 48 Stat. 1283).
78. Railroad Retirement Act of 1934, ch. 868, §§ 1-14, 48 Stat. 1283 (invalidated by
Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330 (1935)).
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Provision for free medical attendance and nursing, for
clothing, for food, for housing, for the education of children,
and a hundred other matters, might with equal propriety be
proposed as tending to relieve the employee of mental strain
and worry. Can it fairly be said that the power of Congress
to regulate interstate commerce extends to the prescription
of any or all of these things? Is it not apparent that they are
really and essentially related solely to the social welfare of
the worker, and therefore remote from any regulation of
commerce as such? We think the answer is plain. These
matters obviously lie outside the orbit of Congressional
power.79
Justice Roberts's statement of congressional power would not
survive long. In an about face two years later, in NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp.,8° a new majority" of the Court broadly con-
strued Congress's Commerce Clause power over conduct affecting
commerce, and upheld the National Labor Relations Acts regulating
unfair labor practices.' The majority reasoned,
[a]lthough activities may be intrastate in character when
separately considered, if they have such a close and substan-
tial relation to interstate commerce that their control is
essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from
burdens and obstructions, Congress cannot be denied the
power to exercise that control.r4
5. United States v. Darby
The invocation of the Tenth Amendment to invalidate Congress's
social welfare enactments under the Commerce Clause finally ended
in 1941. In United States v. Darby, a criminal case involving the
violation of the minimum wage provision of the Fair Labor Standards
79. Railroad Retirement Bd., 295 U.S. at 368.
80. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
81. The new majority consisted of Chief Justice Hughes, Justices Cardozo, Brandeis,
Stone, and Roberts who had switched sides. See Frankfurter, supra note 69, at 313.
82. NLRB, 301 U.S. at 48.
83. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, §§ 1-16,49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified at 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
84. NLRB, 301 U.S. at 37.
85. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
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Act of 1938,86 the Court formally overruled Hammer v.
Dagenhart.' The Court, in its Tenth Amendment discussion, said:
The amendment states but a truism that all is retained which
has not been surrendered. There is nothing in the history of
its adoption to suggest that it was more than declaratory of
the relationship between the national and state governments
as it had been established by'the Constitution before the
amendment or that its purpose was other than to allay fears
that the new national government might seek to exercise
powers not granted, and that the states might not be able to
exercise fully their reserved powers."
A year later in Wickard v. Filburn,89 the Court upheld the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938,'o which penalized a farmer for
growing wheat in excess of the quota established for his farm.9 The
doctrine that agriculture production was not commerce was finally
abandoned.93
Darby relegated the Tenth Amendment to the status of mere
window dressing in its "but a truism" characterization,94 and for the
next thirty-five years the Tenth Amendment was moribund. How-
ever, the Court was not altogether insensitive to the states' need to
regulate commerce, and continued to show deference to states'
regulatory laws when challenged on federal preemption grounds. It
sustained state laws unless Congress clearly intended to preempt
them.95
86. Id at 108 (interpreting Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, §§ 1-19,52 Stat.
1060 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988 & Supp. V 1994))).
87. Id at 116-17 (rejecting Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918)).
88. ld at 124.
89. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
90. Id at 133 (upholding Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, ch. 30, §§ 1-578, 52
Stat. 31 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1281-1407 (1994))).
91. Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, § 339, 52 Stat. at 55.
92. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 64 (1936) ("[The control of agriculture
production [is] a purely local activity."). "[Tihe supervision of agriculture and of other
concerns of a similar nature.... can never be the desirable cares of a general [federal]
jurisdiction." THE FEDERALIST No. 17, at 370-71 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961).
93. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128-29.
94. Darby, 312 U.S. at 124.
95. See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
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B. Modem Developments
1. National League of Cities v. Usery
The Supreme Court resurrected the Tenth Amendment in 1976.
In National League of Cities v. Usery96 the Court, in a five-to-four
decision, held that the application of minimum wage and overtime
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act97 to state and local
government employees violated the Tenth Amendment.98 The Court
stated, "there are attributes of sovereignty attaching to every state
government which may not be impaired by Congress, not because
Congress may lack an affirmative grant of legislative authority to
reach the matter, but because the Constitution prohibits it from
exercising the authority in that manner."'  In striking down
Congress's attempt to subject state and local governments to its
exercise of Commerce Clause powers, the Court drew a line at a point
when congressional legislation regulated "States qua States. ' 1°°
Although National League of Cities did not delimit congressional
power in regulating individuals under the Commerce Clause, it
returned the Tenth Amendment from "but a truism" to an affirmative
prohibition on congressional exercise of power.
This resurrection of the Tenth Amendment was short-lived.- The
Court rejected states' subsequent efforts to declare other federal
statutes invalid on Tenth Amendment grounds. The gradual erosion
of the National Leagues of Cities holding is demonstrated in three
cases. The first is Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation
Ass'n."1  In Hodel the Court rejected the Tenth Amendment
challenge to the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
1977,"° which created a federal scheme of regulating surface mining
on nonfederal land, while permitting state regulation under federal
conditions."°3 The Court explained that, to come under the National
League of Cities proscription, the legislation must satisfy each of three
96. 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (rejecting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968)).
97. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206-207 (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
98. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852.
99. Id. at 845.
100. 1L at 847.
101. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
102. Id. at 293 (upholding 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1988 & Supp. V 1994)).
103. Id- (upholding 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1988 & Supp. V 1994)).
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requirements.' First, there must be a showing that the challenged
statute regulates the "States as States."'"5  Second, the federal
regulation must address matters that are indisputably "attribute[s] of
state sovereignty."" Third, it must be apparent that the states'
compliance with the federal law would directly impair the states'
ability "to structure integral operations in areas of traditional
governmental functions."' ° The Court found that the challenge
could not satisfy the first requirement since the statute did not
regulate the "States as States"; instead, the Act only regulated private
individuals and the activities on their land."~
Virginia's argument that the statute violated the Tenth Amend-
ment by coercing the states into enforcing the federal law by the
threat of direct federal regulation also failed because the surface
mining activities affected interstate commerce, and Congress could
either regulate it directly or choose to allow states a regulatory
role.' 09
The second case, FERC v. Mississippi,"' involved the Public
Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA),"' a federal law
regulating, in part, public utilities, an area which is traditionally a
state function."' The opinion in FERC v. Mississippi expanded the
Hodel decision. The Court gave due deference to the congressional
finding that utility rates affect interstate commerce and, therefore,
congressional regulation was properly within the Commerce Clause
powers."1 3 As to the state's Tenth Amendment challenge that
PURPA mandated the states to consider federal standards in rate
disputes, the Court found that since the field of utility regulation is
preemptible by Congress, the requirement that the state agencies
consider federally created standards was only a condition to continued
state involvement in an area subject to preemption."
4
104. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 287.
105. Id. (quoting National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 854).
106. Id. at 287-88.
107. Id. at 288.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 290-91.
110. 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
111. Id. at 745 (interpreting the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 16
U.S.C. §§ 2601-2645 (1994)).
112. 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2645.
113. FERC, 456 U.S. at 753-58.
114. Id. at 765-66.
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The third case, EEOC v. Wyoming,"11 involved the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act'16 as it applied to Wyoming's game
wardens who were involuntarily retired at age fifty-five under state
law."17 Although the facts in EEOC v. Wyoming were virtually the
same as those in National League of Cities, the federal act was upheld
as a valid exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause powers."' The
majority acknowledged that the Act regulated the states as states, thus
satisfying the first prong of the Hodel test."9 The Court found,
however, that the third prong, requiring that the states' compliance
directly impair their ability to structure internal operations in areas of
traditional governmental functions, was not met.121 The Court
reasoned that the age limit in the Wyoming law only assured the
physical preparedness of its game wardens and Wyoming still could
require fitness test to determine their physical preparedness.21
These three cases foreshadowed the decision of Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth-ority,' which finally overruled
National League of Cities 23' and permitted the application of the
Fair Labor Standards Act 24 requirements to state and local govern-
ment employees."
2. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority
The majority opinion in Garcia reflected the frustration over the
difficult task of drawing a line between what is properly the national
power and what is properly the states' power.'26 The majority found
Hodel's three prong test, and particularly the third prong-whether
the federal law impaired the states' ability "to structure integral
115. 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
116. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
117. EEOC, 460 U.S. at 239.
118. The Court did not decide the question whether the Act was validly adopted under
§ 5 of the 14th Amendment. ad at 243.
119. Id. at 237.
120. It& at 239.
121. Id. at 240.
122. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). Justice Blackmun, whose concurrence supplied the five
member majority in National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 856, authored the Garcia
majority opinion. Justice Blackmun's change of position paralleled Justice Roberts's switch
in 1937. See supra note 69.
123. Id. at 557 (rejecting National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)).
124. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206-207 (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
125. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 560.
126. Id.
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operations in areas of traditional state functions,"-to be unwork-
able.'27
The opinion concluded that instead of the Court having to
wrestle with what are "integral" and "traditional" state governmental
functions, the states' interests were protected by the national political
process, which, in the end, is the Congress." It reasoned that since
Congress is composed 'of elected representatives from the states,
states' interests were protected by their elected representatives."'
In many ways Garcia, like Darby before it, expressed the philosophy
that the Tenth Amendment was nothing more than a statement of
political policy without the force of affirmative prohibition on
congressional action. 30
Three years later the Court, in South Carolina v. Baker,1
3 1
reiterated that the Tenth Amendment "limits are structural, not
substantive-States must find their protection from Congressional
regulation through the national political process, not through judicially
defined spheres of unregulable state activity.'"
Garcia's holding appeared to remove the federal judiciary from
its role interpreting and enforcing the Tenth Amendment. 3 Insofar
as the Tenth Amendment was concerned, Garcia repudiated the
teaching of Marbury v. MadisonM that the power to interpret the
Constitution belongs to the Court and not Congress. 3 The majori-
ty in Garcia, again, temporarily relegated the Tenth Amendment to
the status of mere window dressing.
3., New York v. United States
Seven years after Garcia, despite Garcia's holding that Congress,
and not the Court, should determine the extent of states' rights under
the Tenth Amendment, the Court reached the merits of a Tenth
127. Id. at 547.
128. Id. at 552.
129. Id. at 550-54.
130. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
131. 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
132. Id. at 512 (reciting holding in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528 (1985)).
133. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 557 (Powell, J., dissenting).
134. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 49 (1803).
135. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546-47.
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Amendment challenge brought by the State of New York against the
federal government in New York v. United States.
36
New York involved the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Amendments Act of 1985,137 which amended the 1980 Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Act.'38 The 1980 Act permitted states to
enter into regional compacts for the disposal of low-level radioactive
waste and to ultimately exclude nonmember states from using the
compact states' disposal sites.3 9 However, the 1980 Act did not
provide for any penalties for states that refused or failed to enter into
compacts.14  The 1985 amendments provided the penalties.1
4 1
Undoubtedly, the 1985 amendments were enacted to resolve a serious
national problem-the lack' of disposal sites for low-level radioactive
waste.42 Their objective was to force the states that had not devel-
oped disposal sites to take action in developing adequate disposal sites
by either in-state or regional compacts. 43 Instead of creating a
federal program of disposal sites for such waste under its Commerce
Clause powers, Congress sought to compel the states to develop these
sites.'"
Despite the facial language of the statute commanding the states
to take action, the Court construed the statute as a measure to spur
the states into action by providing three incentives.45
The first incentive was monetary, and permitted states to impose
a surcharge upon low-level radioactive waste received from other
states with a portion of the surcharge sent to the secretary of
energy.146 This money went to a fund used for payments to states
which achieved the federal statutory goals in developing such waste
disposal sites.47 The second ' incentive permitted the states to
impose additional surcharges and to ultimately deny access to their
136. 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
137. Pub. L. No. 99-240. 99 Stat. 1842 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2021b-j (1988)).
138. Pub. L. No. 96-573, 94 Stat. 3347 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2021b-j (1988)).
139. Id. § 4(a)(2), 94 Stat. at 3348.
140. See 94 Stat. at 3347-49.
141. 99 Stat. at 1853-54.
142. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2415.
143. 99 Stat. at 1852-54.
144. For example, see the "take title" provision. Id. at 1850-51.
145. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2425.
146. Id.
147. 99 Stat. at 1849.
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sites to states that had not complied with the federal goals.'48 The
third and final incentive or penalty required states that did not comply
with the federal requirements to take title to all the waste generated
in these states and become liable as the owners of the waste. 49
In essence, the federal law, in furthering the important national
purpose of having adequate disposal sites for low-level radioactive
waste in the nation, classified states as either good or bad depending
on their actions in developing waste disposal sites.' 50 The good
states are those that develop disposal sites, either in-state or by
regional compact, in accordance with congressional goals.' The
recalcitrant states are the bad states.152 The good states receive
their share of surcharge fees.53 The excellent ones receive the extra
reward of a share of the pot collected by the secretary of energy from
the states' surcharges.' 54 The waste generators from the bad states
pay increasingly higher surcharges for use of the sites and, eventually,
will be unable to get rid of their waste. 55 The ultimate punishment
is that in the end the bad states become the owners of the waste, with
all the attendant liabilities of owners and with no place to dispose the
waste they now own.156
The third incentive, the "take title" provision, was struck down
as a violation of the Tenth Amendment.57 The Court emphasized
that "the framers explicitly chose a Constitution that confers upon
Congress the power to regulate individuals, not States."'15
The Court then said:
[T]he Constitution would not permit Congress simply to
transfer radioactive waste from generators to state govern-
ments. Such a transfer, standing alone, would in principle be
no different than a congressionally compelled subsidy from
state governments to radioactive waste producers. The same
148. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2425.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 2416.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. 99 Stat. at 1849.
154. Id. at 1849-50.
155. Id at 1852-54.
156. Id. at 1849-50.
157. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2427-28.
158. Id. at 2423.
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is true of the provision requiring the States to become liable
for the generators' damages.159
The Court found that the alternative given to the states in order
to avoid the take title penalty was to comply with the federally
mandated goals of developing disposal sites." - This alternative
violated the Tenth Amendment because Congress has no power to
compel states to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.
161
[T]he second alternative held out to state govern-
ments-regulating pursuant to Congress' direction-would,
standing alone, present a simple command to state govern-
ments to implement legislation enacted by Congress. As we
have seen, the Constitution does not empower Congress to
subject state governments to this type of instruction.1 62
Therefore, "[a] choice between two unconstitutionally coercive
regulatory techniques is no choice at all."'6
On the other hand, the Court upheld the overall congressional
scheme and approved the first two incentives.)" The Court sus-
tained the first incentive by characterizing the states' collection of the
surcharges simply as "an unexceptionable exercise of Congress's
power to authorize the States to burden interstate commerce.'
16
It explained that the federal share of the proceeds creating a federal
fund to reward good states, was "no more than a federal tax on
interstate commerce."' 66
159. l at 2428.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.; cf. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947) (holding that a state court may not
refuse to entertain federally created causes of action if it can entertain similar state claims).
Relying on Testa, FERC, and Garcia, a recent two-to-one Ninth Circuit Court decision
distinguished New York and rejected a Tenth Amendment challenge to the federal Brady
Handgun Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(1) (1994) which required state and local
enforcement authorities to conduct background checks on prospective gun purchases.
Mack v. United States, Nos. 94-16940, 95-35037, 94-17002, 94-36193,1995 WL 527616 (9th
Cir. Sept. 8, 1995).
163. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2428.
164. Id. at 2425-27.
165. Id. at 2425. The Court relied principally on Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328
U.S. 408 (1946), which sustained the McCarran Act permitting states to regulate the
insurance business. However, the McCarran Act, while permitting states to regulate the
insurance industry, does not offer federal incentives to actively encourage states to
discriminate against sister states. Additionally, no authority was cited which supports the
notion that in regulating commerce, Congress could purposefully discriminate against some
states and not others.
166. New York, 112 S.Ct. at 2426.
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The Court upheld the second incentive because it was also a
permissible congressionally authorized burden on interstate com-'
merce.167 The Court reasoned that states had the choice of not
complying with the federal goals, with the resulting penalty falling
only on the waste generators of these states and not the states
themselves." Since Congress has the power to regulate private
parties under the Commerce Clause, the second incentive was simply
a conditional exercise of Congress's Commerce power. 69
New York is remarkable not only because it resurrected the
Tenth Amendment and returned it to the jurisdiction of the judicial
branch, but also because the Court, without any dissent, approved
Congress's power to encourage states to burden commerce by
discriminating against sister states. This means that Congress can pit
states against states and accomplish indirectly what it could not do
directly-command states to carry out congressional policies.
The approval of the second incentive in New York is disturbing
because it opens the door to congressionally approved state laws
discriminating against sister states and their citizens.' For exam-
ple, such a doctrine could permit states to exact a fee for, or deny,
entry of automobiles, boats, or machinery from states that do not
comply with federally approved state regulatory standards. Conceiv-
ably, Congress could permit a state to deny entry of automobiles from
other states that do not have stringent emission tests for automobiles.
Such a denial resurrects the specter of discriminatory laws such as the
California law criminalizing the importation of indigent persons struck
down by the Court in Edwards v. California."
The Court may still clarify this doctrine, and draw a new line of
what is impermissible. Nonetheless, it is unfortunate that this serious
issue escaped any meaningful discussion by the Court in New York.
The exercise of this power, permitting Congress to pit states
against sister states, carries with it inevitable risks of creating conflicts
among the states. The Court has long recognized that adopting the
167. Id. at 2427.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See ih ("As a simple regulation, this provision would be within the power of
Congress to authorize the States to discriminate against interstate commerce.").
171. 314 U.S. 160 (1941). Although the decision was grounded on the Equal Protection
Clause of the 14th Amendment, four of the Justices believed that the holding should be
based on the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the 14th Amendment. Id. at 179-81, 183
(Douglas, J., concurring).
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Constitution and entrusting the national government with the power
to regulate commerce among the states was intended to avoid
conflicts which existed previously when commerce was regulated
indirectly by the several states.172
In Baldwin v. Seelig' Justice Cardozo said: "The Constitution
was framed under the dominion of a political philosophy less
parochial in range. It was framed upon the theory that the peoples
of the several states must sink or swim together, and that in the long
run prosperity and salvation are in union and not division.'
7 4
As Madison noted, "'want of a general power over Commerce
led to an exercise of this power separately, by the States, which not
only proved abortive, but engendered rival, conflicting and angry
regulations.' ,, 7 He added that at that time, "'each State would
legislate according to its estimate of its own interests, the importance
of its own products, and the local advantages or disadvantages of its
position in a political or commercial view.',176 These events
"'threaten at once the peace and safety of the Union.""'
Alexander Hamilton, in urging the adoption of the Constitution,
said:
The competitions of commerce would be another fruitful
source of contention .... Each State, or separate confeder-
acy, would pursue a system of commercial polity peculiar to
itself. This would occasion distinctions, preferences and
exclusions, which would beget discontent. The habits of
intercourse, on the basis of equal privileges, to which we
have been accustomed from the earliest settlement of the
country, would give a keener edge to those causes of
discontent, than they would naturally have, independent of
this circumstance .... The infractions of these regulations
on one side, the efforts to prevent and repel them on the
172. See H. P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 533-34 (1949); Welton v.
Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 280-81 (1875); Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
173. 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
174. Id. at 523.
175. H. P. Hood, 336 U.S. at 534 (quoting 3 MAX FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION 547 (1937)).
176. Id. at 533 (quoting JOSEPH STORY, THE CoNsTrruTioN, §§ 259-260 (1833)).
177. Id. (quoting STORY, supra note 177, §§ 259-260).
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other, would naturally lead to outrages, and these to
reprisals and wars.178
Giving Congress the power to encourage states to burden
commerce results in the same undesirable consequences described by
Hamilton over two centuries ago.
The Court's answer in New York, that the penalty denying access
to disposal sites do not implicate the Tenth Amendment because they
fall on only private parties, is unsatisfactory. Unlike other measures
in the regulation of commerce, these penalties do not uniformly fall
on private parties throughout the United States. They fall only on a
class of private parties, generators of low-level radioactive waste in
certain states-those states which chose to not comply with federally
desired goals. As a practical matter, New York empowers Congress
to create federal laws encouraging states to discriminate against
citizens of other states based solely on their state citizenship and the
inaction of their respective state governments.
In addition to approving Congress's Commerce Clause power to
encourage states to burden commerce, New York appears to implicitly
approve congressionally sanctioned state violation of the Privileges
and Immunities Clause.179 The Court's failure to address this impor-
tant question is also unfortunate. 80
Moreover, although Congress can penalize private parties whose
conduct it deems undesirable under the Commerce Clause, 8' the
generators of low-level radioactive waste are not engaged in conduct
that Congress deems undesirable."8 In fact, certain waste genera-
tors, such as medical facilities and hospitals using low-level radioactive
178. THE FEDERALIST No. 7 (Alexander Hamilton); see also Exxon Corp. v. Governor
of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 151 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (asserting the Commerce Clause prevents a state from enacting legislation favoring
in-state economic interests).
179. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; see Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948) (holding
that South Carolina's discriminatory fee on nonresidents' shrimp boats violated the
Privileges and Immunities Clause).
180. It is inconceivable that the Commerce Clause could provide Congress with the
power to encourage states to violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause, which is a part
of the same Constitution. Although Congress has broad powers under § 5 of the 14th
Amendment, it is unlikely that encouraging the violation of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, which is a part of the 14th Amendment, could be considered the appropriate
enforcement of the 14th Amendment.
181. For example, the use of child labor in the manufacture of goods. Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116
(1941).
182. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2414.
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products to treat the sick, are obviously engaged in socially desirable
conduct.
By finding the take title provision unconstitutional while retaining
the rest of the Act, the Court altered Congress's objective of
penalizing recalcitrant states and, instead, subjected the waste
generators of these states to penalties. By placing the penalty on
those who are otherwise blameless, and making them the ultimate
object of the penalty, the Court changed the statutory scheme and
substituted a scheme which, in the long run, could be just as injurious
to the Union as the Tenth Amendment violation it found in the take
title provision.
Instead of striking down the federal legislation in toto and thus
forcing Congress to directly regulate the area and to develop federally
created low-level radioactive waste disposal sites,"8 3 the New York
Court approved the scheme of divide and conquer with the potential
result of disunity and discord among the states. In doing so, the
Court ignored the historical understanding that the Commerce Clause
was enacted to preserve the Union by eliminating discrimination by
states against one another. Against this background, the Constitution
should be interpreted to strengthen the Union and not to weaken it.
With the Civil War as a painful part of our history, the Court should
have been mindful that the national government should not engage
in the fostering of discord among the states.
4. United States v. Lopez
Three years after New York v. United States, the Court decided
United States v. Lopez,m" another five-to-four decision. Lopez was
a criminal case concerning the violation of a federal statute which
penalized the possession of a firearm in a congressionally defined
school zone. 5 The Court concluded that the statute was invalid
because its connection with commerce was insubstantial, stating that
"the possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an
economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substan-
tially affect any sort of interstate commerce."'
86
183. For example, in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, Congress authorized the federal
government to select sites for the disposal of high-level nuclear wastes. 42 U.S.C.
§ 10132(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Congress has conditionally validated the selection of
Yucca Mountain, Nevada, as the site. See id. § 10134(f)(3)(1988).
184. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
185. Id. at 1626.
186. Id. at 1634.
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Acknowledging that its prior decisions could support this
congressional exercise of power, the Court stated:
The broad language in these opinions has suggested the
possibility of additional expansion, but we decline here to
proceed any further. To do so would require us to conclude
that the Constitution's enumeration of powers does not
presuppose something not enumerated, ... and that there
never will be a distinction between what is truly national and
what is truly local .... This we are unwilling to do.'
Although Lopez marks the first invalidation since the 1930s of a
congressional Commerce Clause enactment that regulated private
conduct,'88 the majority opinion simply reflected the need to curb
the erosion of states' powers by halting decades of unchecked
expansion of Congress's Commerce Clause powers. In this context
the Lopez decision is a small step to preserve "'a healthy balance of
power between the States and the Federal Government [which] will
reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front."'189 On the
other hand, the majority opinion reaffirmed Congress's power to
regulate under the Commerce Clause in three areas: (1) the channels
of interstate commerce; (2) the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce; and (3) those activities having a "substantial relation" to
interstate commerce. 9°
The Court rejected the use of the word "affect" and reiterated
that the regulated activity must "substantially affect" interstate
commerce. 9' The Court concluded that "[w]here economic activity
substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that
activity will be sustained."'" The legislation in question, which did
not contain any congressional findings as to the effect of the
prohibited conduct on interstate commerce,9 was invalid.
The change in standard from affect to substantially affect
undoubtedly shifted the balance between state and federal power in
favor of the states. However, that determination requires a case-by-
case analysis as to what substantially affects interstate commerce. In
187. Id. (citations omitted).
188. Id. at 1636-37.
189. Id. at 1626 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)).
190. Id. at 1629-30.
191. Id. at 1630.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1630-31.
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that process, congressional findings regarding the effect on interstate
commerce are considered by the court." Moreover, the legislation
in Lopez concerned two areas: "criminal law enforcement [and]
education where States historically have been sovereign.""19  In
areas that are not historically or traditionally considered to be within
the states' internal police power,196 congressional legislation may be
given greater sweep.
Lopez, therefore, signaled the Court's attempt to arrest the
expansion of federal Commerce Clause power and to draw a line of
defense protecting states' rights because of its concern that the
expansion of federal Commerce Clause power would obscure the line
"between what is truly national and what is truly local."
197
More tellingly Justice Thomas's desire to revisit the jurisprudence
of the past sixty years" did not draw any support from the other
Justices who formed the majority. In referring to past cases affirming
the congressional legislation, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice
O'Connor, stated, "These and like authorities are within the fair
ambit of the Court's practical conception of commercial regulation
and are not called in question by our decision today."', In light of
the narrow five-to-four majority in Lopez, and the strong policy of
stare decisis, there is little likelihood that Justice Thomas's desire will
be realized. However, the Lopez decision will undoubtedly call into
question existing congressional legislation which is not conditioned on
the receipt of federal funds and which directly regulate public safety,
health, and welfare as to their "substantial relation" to commerce.2°
III. THE TENTH AMENDMENT AND THE SPENDING CLAUSE
The federal government's ability to tax on a national level, and
the attendant ability to spend for the general welfare, is a major
194. Id. at 1631.
195. Id. at 1632.
196. See Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U.S. 678,683 (1883). The Court stated that "the
states have full power to regulate within their limits matters of internal policy, including
in that general designation whatever will promote the peace, comfort, convenience, and
prosperity of their people." Id.
197. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634 (citations omitted).
198. Id. at 1642 (Thomas, J., concurring).
199. Id. at 1637 (Kennedy & O'Connor, R3., concurring).
200. E.g., Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300f-j (1988 & Supp. V 1994)
(regulating contaminant levels in drinking water); cf Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)
(1988) (regulating the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters of the United
States).
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source of federal power. In recent years, congressional use of its
Spending Clause power, alone or together with its Commerce Clause
power, has been the foremost factor in the expansion of federal
powers and the attendant surrender of states' rights. This extensive
use of the spending power, however, is of recent origin.
A. Early Understanding of the Spending Clause
In the early days of the Union, there was considerable debate
over the meaning of the Spending Clause language "To ... provide
for the ... general Welfare of the United States."' In 1817, two
years before McCulloch v. Maryland" was decided, President
James Madison vetoed the Internal Improvement Bill 3 on the
ground that the building of roads and canals was not among the
enumerated powers of Congress.2"
More significantly, Madison also rejected the notion that the
General Welfare Clause authorized such congressional legislation. 5
Madison believed that giving Congress such broad power, as the
language appears to provide, would give Congress a general legislative
power totally contrary to the specific enumeration of powers in the
Constitution.2" He also expressed the opinion that interpreting the
Spending Clause to encompass only the expenditure of federal money
with the states' consent would still violate the Constitution.2 7
Madison said:
A restriction of the power "to provide for the common
defense and general welfare," to cases which are to be
provided for by the expenditure of money, would still leave
within the legislative power of Congress all the great and
most important measures of Government money being the
ordinary and necessary means of carrying them into execu-
tion .... If a general power to construct roads and canals,
and to improve the navigation of water courses, with the
train of powers incident thereto, be not possessed by
Congress, the assent of the States in the mode provided in
201. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (the General Welfare Clause).
202. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
203. Also known as Calhoun's Bonus Bill, a bill providing federal funds for the building
of roads and canals. 30 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 1059-62 (1817) (Madison Veto Message).
204. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
205. 30 ANNALS, supra note 203, at 1060-61 (Madison veto message).
206. Id.
207. Id
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the bill cannot confer the power. The only cases in which
the consent and cession of particular States can extend the
power of Congress, are those specified and provided for in
the Constitution.'
B. The Early Cases
The Supreme Court did not agree with Madison's narrow
interpretation of the scope of the enumerated powers. In connection
with the Commerce Clause power, McCulloch v. Maryland" firmly
established the doctrine that Congress possesses powers not enumerat-
ed in the Constitution, including those Congress determines necessary
and proper to carry out the enumerated powers.21 A century later,
in Massachusetts v. Mellon,211 Massachusetts challenged a congressio-
nal enactment conditioning federal funding, for the protection of the
health of mothers and infants, on the states' consent to federal
provisions.? The Court, in dictum, said, "Probably, it would be
sufficient to point out that the powers of the State are not invaded,
since the statute imposes no obligation, but simply extends an option
which the state is free to accept or reject."2 '3 The Court went on to
say that
[i]n the last analysis, the complaint of theplaintiff state is
brought to the naked contention that Congress has usurped
the reserved powers of the several States by the mere
enactment of the statute, though nothing has been done and
nothing is to be done without their consent. It is plain that
that question, as it is thus presented, is political and not
judicial in character, and therefore is not a matter which
admits of the exercise of the judicial power.2"4
208. Id; 2 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 569-70 (1897).
209. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
210. Id. at 427.
211. 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (also known as Frothingham v. Mellon).
212. Id. at 479.
213. Id. at 480.
214. Id. at 483. This broad statement on the political question doctrine has not been
invoked by the Court in subsequent Tenth Amendment challenges brought by the states
against the United States. In Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12 (1927), the Court, without
mentioning the political question doctrine, disapproved Florida's right to bring a parens
patriae action, id. at 18, and denied Florida's petition for leave to file an original
jurisdiction complaint against the Secretary of the Treasury, id. However, the Court's
opinion in Florida clearly rejected the State's Tenth Amendment challenge against the
federal inheritance tax. Id. at 17. In Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Commis-
sion, 330 U.S. 127 (1947), the Court rejected the federal government's argument that the
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Mellon is notable for two reasons. First, just a year before, in a
lawsuit involving a private party, the Court had invalidated the Child
Labor Tax Act2 " in a decision based, in part, on the Tenth Amend-
ment.216 In Mellon, however, the Court refused to entertain the
States' Tenth Amendment challenge.217 Second, without the citation
of any authority, the Court, in dictum, approved the now universal
practice of providing federal funding with conditions attached.218
In United States v. Butler219 the Court finally rejected Madison's
view that the Spending Clause's general welfare language was limited
to expenditures under the enumerated powers in the Constitution.
The Court said, "It results that the power of Congress to authorize
expenditure of public moneys for public purposes is not limited by the
direct grants of. legislative power found in the Constitution.""0
Although concluding that the Spending Clause power is not
limited by the enumerated powers in other parts of the Constitution,
the Butler Court found another constitutional limitation to the
Spending Clause power, the Tenth Amendment, and struck down the
Agricultural Adjustment Act."2 This Act imposed a processing tax
on cotton and used the revenue to compensate farmers in acreage
reduction agreements with the government.' The Court said:
From the accepted doctrine that the United States is a
government of delegated powers, it follows that those not
expressly granted, or reasonably to be implied from such as
are conferred, are reserved to the states or to the people.
To forestall any suggestion to the contrary, the Tenth
Amendment was adopted. The same proposition, otherwise
stated, is that powers not granted are prohibited. No power
constitutionality of the Hatch Act, 7 U.S.C. § 361 (repealed 1955), is a political question
by pointing out the statutory provision providing for judicial review. Oklahoma, 330 U.S.
at 134-35.
215. Child Labor Tax Act, ch. 18, 99 1200-07, 40 Stat. 1138 (1919) (repealed and
superceded by ch. 136, § 1400, 42 Stat. 321 (1921)).'
216. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922) (Child Labor Tax Case); see
also WILLIAM Ross, A MUTED FURY: POPULIST, PROGRESSIVES AND LABOR UNIONS
CONFRONT THE COURTS, 1890-1937, at 187-90 (1988).
217. Mellon, 262 U.S. at 480.
218. See id. at 460.
219. 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
220. Id. at 66.
221. Id. at 68.
222. Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, ch. 25, §§ 1-46, 48 Stat. 31 (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 601-624 (1994)).
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is given to regulate agricultural production and therefore
legislation by Congress for that purpose is forbidden.m'
The Court, therefore, narrowed the scope of the Spending Clause
by broadly interpreting the Tenth Amendment.224
Butler also rejected the notion that payment with consent of the
payee is necessarily voluntary:
The Government asserts that whatever might be said against
the validity of the plan, if compulsory, it is constitutionally
sound because the end is accomplished by voluntary
co-operation. There are two sufficient answers to the
contention. The regulation is not in fact voluntary. The
farmer, of course, may refuse to comply, but the price of
such refusal is the loss of benefits. The amount offered is
intended to be sufficient to exert pressure on him to agree
to the proposed regulation. The power to confer or with-
hold unlimited benefits is the power to coerce or destroy. If
the cotton grower elects not to accept the benefits, he will
receive less for his crops; those who receive payments will be
able to undersell him. The result may well be financial
ruin.2
The Court then explained, "but if the plan were one for purely
voluntary co-operation it would stand no better so far as federal
power is concerned. At best it is a scheme for purchasing with
federal funds submission to federal regulation of a subject reserved to
the states." 6
C. Steward Machinery Co. v. Davis (The Unemployment
Compensation Case)
The Butler Court's interpretation of the Tenth Amendment did
not last long.2 7 The next year, in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis
223. Butler, 297 U.S. at 68.
224. The result reached in, Butler validated national spending programs for the general
welfare, such as public works programs, as long as states' interests, such as the regulation
of businesses, were not involved. Id. at 70.
225. Id. at 71.
226. Id. at 72.
227. The Butler decision precipitated the controversial "court-packing" plan submitted
by President Roosevelt to Congress on February 7, 1937. See William E. Leuchtenburg,
The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Court-Packing" Plan, 1966 SuP. Cr. REV. 347; see
also supra note 42.
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(The Unemployment Compensation Case),' the Court removed
Butler's Tenth Amendment limitation on Congress's Spending Clause
powers and upheld the constitutionality of the Social Security Act's
provisions assessing a payroll tax on employers and granting federal
funds to the states to assist them in the administration of their
unemployment insurance laws. 29  The Court reasoned that the
unemployment crisis, affecting millions of people, justified congressio-
nal legislation:
The fact developed quickly that the states were unable to
give the requisite relief The problem had become national
in area and dimensions. There was need of help from the
nation if the people were not to starve. It is too late today
for the argument to be heard with tolerance that in a crisis
so extreme the use of the moneys of the nation to relieve
the unemployed and their dependents is a use for any
purpose narrower than the promotion of the general
welfare.23
The Court also rejected the argument that federal law coerced
the states into adopting unemployment compensation law in accor-
dance with federal requirements by pointing out that it was voluntary
and that the states can, at their pleasure, repeal such state laws.?'
The Court, however, recognized that in some circumstances, the
financial inducement offered by Congfess might be so coercive so that
"pressure turns into compulsion. ' ' 2
On the same day, the Court upheld the old-age benefit provisions
of the Social Security Act in Helvering v. Davis. 3 In answer to the
contention that paying old-age benefits is not authorized by the
General Welfare Clause, Justice Cardozo's majority opinion stated,
"Whether wisdom or unwisdom resides in the scheme of benefits...
is not for us to say. The answer to such inquiries must come from
Congress, not the courts. Our concern here, as often, is with power,
not with wisdom."'
228. 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
229. Id. at 585.
230. Id. at 586-87.
231. Id at 592-93. But see Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Sec.
Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41 (1986) (holding that Congress can prohibit states from
withdrawing from the Social Security system).
232. Steward, 301 U.S. at 590.
233. 301 U.S. 619, 645-46 (1937).
234. Id. at 644.
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D. Validity and Limitations on Congressional Conditions Attached
to Federal Funding Schemes
With the power to tax and spend federal funds for the general
welfare, Congress often attaches conditions to federal funding
schemes to ensure that federal funds are spent in accordance with its
wishes. When states or their political subdivisions are the recipients
of the federal funds, these conditions often conflict with the states'
right to determine public policy.
In Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Commission, the
Court sustained the Hatch Act provision requiring state officers and
employees who were paid with federal funds to refrain from partisan
political activities." Although the United States Civil Service
Commission's sanction ordered the removal of a Highway Commis-
sion member, it also required the withholding of highway funds to
Oklahoma in "an amount equal to two years' compensation" of the
officer if the offending officer was not removed 7  The opinion
noted that Oklahoma did not suspend the officer:
As nothing in this record shows any attempt to suspend Mr.
Paris from his duties as a member of the State Highway
Commission, we are not called upon to deal with the
assertion of Oklahoma that a state officer may be suspended
by a federal court if § 12 is valid. There is an adequate
separability clause. No penalty was imposed upon the state
.... Oklahoma chose not to remove him. We do not see
any violation of the state's sovereignty in the hearing or
order. Oklahoma adopted the "simple expedient" of not
yielding to what she urges is federal coercion.... The offer
of benefits to a state by the United States dependent upon
cooperation by the state with federal plans, assumedly for
the general welfare, is not unusual.'
Oklahoma entrenched the principle that Congress may attach
conditions to federal funds as long as the states have the choice of
refusing the federal funds.
235. 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
236. Id. at 142-43.
237. Id. at 129-30 n.1 (citation omitted).
238. Id. at 143-44.
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However, congressional power to attach conditions to the receipt
of federal funds by the states is not limitless. In South Dakota v.
Dole 9 the Court upheld a congressional enactment requiring each
state to adopt a twenty-one-year-old drinking age, or suffer the loss
of five percent of its receipt of federal highway funds.24 The Court
made clear that "[t]he Spending power is of course not unlimit-
ed,"24 and articulated four restrictions on the exercise of Congress's
Spending Clause power:242
(1) The exercise of the spending power must be in pursuit of the
general welfare in accordance with the Constitution. Due deference
is to be given to congressional judgment in this regard. 3
(2) If Congress wants to attach conditions to the grant of federal
funds, it must do so unambiguously so that the states may "exercise
their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their
participation."2"
(3) Conditions placed upon federal grants may be illegitimate if
"they are unrelated 'to the federal interest in particular national
projects or programs.' ,245
(4) "Other constitutional provisions may provide an independent
bar to the conditional grant of federal funds."
246
Since the decisions in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis47 and
Helvering v. Davis,248 the spending of federal money in areas
deemed by Congress to be in the interest of the nation's general
welfare has grown to cover virtually every aspect of state and local
239. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
240. Id. at 212.
241. Id. at 207 (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 n.13
(1981)).
242. Id. at 207-08.
243. Id. (citing Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-41 (1937); United States v. Butler,
297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936)). The level of deference was left unanswered. However, the Court
questioned whether general welfare is a judicially enforceable restriction at all. hL at 207
n.2.
244. Id. at 207 (citing Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17).
245. Id. at 207-08 (citing Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978)).
246. Id. at 208 (citing Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist., 469 U.S. 256,
269-70 (1985); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 91 (1976); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333
n.34 (1968)). However, the majority in Dole rejected the argument that the Twenty-first
Amendment is an independent bar to the federal condition, noting that the result desired
by Congress-the 21-year-old drinking age-is not unconstitutional. Id. at 209-12.
247. 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
248. 301 U.S. 619 (1937).
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government operations.?" They range from street and highway
construction and repair 5  healthI51 welfare,252 housing,25 3 edu-
cation,2 recreation, 25" and law enforcement,' 6 to sanitation and
waste disposal. 7 Typically, federal payments made to the states
and local governments contain federally mandated conditions with the
loss or reduction of federal funds as sanctions for noncompliance.'58
In virtually all federal funding schemes, states and their political
subdivisions may choose not to apply for the funds. However, as the
Court in Butler v. United States259 recognized, a choice not to apply
for the federal funds results in that state losing its share of the money,
placing the state at an economic disadvantage vis-a-vis the other
states.260 For example, a state's decision to forego federal funds for
welfare payments would result in the need to either raise the lost
dollars from new taxes, or reduce levels of benefits to its welfare
recipients. Either alternative would result in serious economic
consequences to the state and its citizens. Additionally, the state's
taxpayers, who contribute to the federal funds, would receive less in
249. See infra notes 251-58.
250. See, e.g., 23 U.S.C. §§ 101-158 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
251. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300u-2(b) (1988) (providing grants to states and other entities
for health information and health promotion).
252. See, e.g., id. §§ 601-602 (providing aid to families with dependent children).
253. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. 1437-1440 (West 1994 & Supp. 1995) (assisting states in
funding low-income housing).
254. See, e.g., Improving America's Schools Act of 1994,20 U.S.C.A. § 6301-8962 (West
Supp. 1995). Although education is not an enumerated power in the Constitution and has
always been considered to be a state sovereign function, Lopez v. United States, 115 S. Ct.
1624, 1632 (1995), recent congressional legislation in the education area does not appear
to rely on the Spending Clause but broadly pronounced goals, standards, and mandates.
See, e.g., Goals 2000: Educate America Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 5801-6084 (West Supp. 1995),
particularly §§ 5821, 5842, 5881. But see 20 U.S.C. § 8904 (providing that no state is
required to participate in any program under Goals 2000).
255. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1261 (1994) (authorizing National Recreation Trails Fund).
256. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 88 3793, 3796dd (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (providing for grants
to states for public safety and community policing).
257. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3108 (1988) (providing federal assistance for
construction of water and sewage facilities).
258. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C.A § 6232 (West Supp. 1993). On the other hand, 20 U.S.C.A.
§ 7709, particularly subsections (a), (d)(2), and (e), appears to prohibit state conduct
outright without the penalty of the loss or reduction of federal funds. See also 20 U.S.C.A.
§ 8892. But see 20 U.S.C.A. § 8902 (prohibiting federal mandates, direction, and control
of state educational policies and state and local resource allocations). An outright
prohibition would conflict with South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
259. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
260. l& at 70-71.
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return for their contributions. Accordingly, although there is a
theoretical choice, as a practical matter it is often illusory.
Moreover, as more federal funds are available for state and local
programs, greater dependency on such funds results. The choice to
reject the funds then becomes more and more infeasible. In this
context the statement in Butler that "the power to confer or withhold
unlimited benefits is the power to coerce or destroy" '6 ' is accurate.
The conditions attached to such funds are, in a true sense, coercive
because the states that have become dependent on federal funding for
their governmental operations cannot survive without them.
On the other hand, accepting Justice Cardozo's view in Steward
that the national government has a legitimate role in solving the
nation's social and economic ills,262 Congress's only means of
ensuring the proper use of federal funds is to attach federal conditions
to the provision of funds to the states. This is particularly necessary
in areas where Congress does not have the power to directly regulate
the state.6 The question then becomes how reasonable are the
conditions, and what limitation does the Tenth Amendment place on
this congressional power.
Despite the pervasive federal power, states' interests are
protected, to a large extent, by the restrictions articulated in Dole.
264
Applying the Dole test, a states' Tenth Amendment challenge in a
Spending Clause case will most likely depend on the question of
whether the federal conditions are rationally related to legitimate
federal interests in the particular federal funding program. Defining
a legitimate federal interest, in these situations, awaits future Supreme
Court decisions. It is possible that the Court may conclude that
outside the sphere of Congress's enumerated powers, federal interest
extends only to the proper accounting of the funds. Therefore,
conditions which usurp the states' role to make policy choices may be
unconstitutional as violative of the Tenth Amendment.265 Addition-
261. Id. at 71.
262. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 587-91 (1937).
263. If Congress has the power to directly regulate the area, for example, under its
Commerce Clause power, Congress could elect to permit states to regulate that area under
federally mandated conditions. Such a scheme has long been held to be a proper exercise
of Congress's Commerce Clause powers. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
264. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
265. Although line-drawing in this area is virtually impossible, the following
hypothetical may be illustrative. In providing funds to rebuild public school buildings
destroyed by the flooding of the Mississippi River, it is proper to condition federal funding
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ally, federal conditions may violate other constitutional provisions
concerning the relationship of the national government to the
states.
266
IV. THE TENTH AMENDMENT AND THE CIVIL WAR
AMENDMENTS
The Civil War and the subsequent adoption of the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments dramatically changed the
balance of power between the national and state governments. These
constitutional amendments gave Congress sweeping power to protect
the rights of all persons within the United States. This expansion of
federal power resulted in the corresponding diminution of states'
power.
A. Early Cases
Shortly after the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment in
1865,267 Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866.2 Section
1 of the Act broadly mandates that "all persons born in the United
States and not subject to any foreign power ... are declared to be
citizens of the United States" and entitled them to have the same
rights as those enjoyed by white citizens 69  Section 2 prescribes
on the building of the new schools above the flood plain. Such a condition is within
Congress's Property Clause power to insure that federal money is not wasted by
subsequent flooding and its Commerce Clause power to regulate a navigable river. United
States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940). It is also unquestioned that
the expenditure of the funds must comply with civil rights laws and be properly accounted
for. On the other hand, it would be improper for Congress to condition the granting of
federal money on the states' acquiescence to federally desired curriculum requirements
since education is neither a constitutionally enumerated area of federal power nor is it a -
federal constitutional right. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1633 (1995); San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
266. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (directing the United States to "guarantee to every
State in this Union a Republican Form of Government"); New York v. United States, 112
S. Ct. 2408,2433 (1992) (declining to reach the Guarantee Clause challenge as to the take
title provision but rejecting the challenges to the other two provisions).
267. The Thirteenth Amendment provides:
Section 1. Neither Slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment
for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within
the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
268. Ch. 31, §§ 1-10, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
269. Id. § 1, 14 Stat. at 27.
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criminal penalties against persons who under color of any law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, or custom, deprive any inhabitant of any state
or territory of rights secured by the Act.' Since the Thirteenth
Amendment does not, on its face, refer to the states, doubts arose as
to the constitutionality of the Act as applied to the states.271
The Fourteenth Amendment was then adopted in 1868. Section
1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that
"no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." '72
In 1870 Congress reenacted The Civil Rights Act.2" Congress
enacted additional civil rights legislation in 1875.274 In Ex parte
Virginia 5 the Court upheld the criminal prosecution of a Virginia
state court judge for the violation of a provision of the Civil Rights
Act of 1875.276 The Court rejected Virginia's argument that the
selection of jurors and the administration of law belong to the State
and cannot be dictated by Congress. The Court stated:
Nor does it make any difference that such legislation is
restrictive of what the State might have done before the
constitutional amendment was adopted. The prohibitions of
the Fourteenth Amendment are directed to the States, and
they are to a degree restrictions of State power .... It is
said the selection of jurors for her courts and the administra-
tion of her laws belong to each State; that they are her
rights. This is true in the general. But in exercising her
rights, a State cannot disregard the limitations which the
Federal Constitution has applied to her power. Her rights
do not reach to that extent. Nor can she deny to the general
government the right to exercise all its granted powers,
though they may interfere with the full enjoyment of rights
she would have if those powers had not been thus granted.
270. ld. § 2, 14 Stat. at 27.
271. See Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 32-33 (1948).
272. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
273. Ch. 114, §§ 1-23, 16 Stat. 140 (1870).
274. Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, § 4, 18 Stat. 336 (current version at 18 U.S.C.
§ 243 (1988)).
275. 100 U.S. 339 (1880).
276. Id. at 349 (upholding prosecution under ch. 114, §§ 3-5, 18 Stat. at 336).
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Indeed, every addition of power to the general government
involves a corresponding diminution of the governmental
powers of the States. It is carved out of them.2 '
Three years later in the Civil Rights Cases,78 the Court struck
down the public accommodation provisions of the Civil Rights Act of
1875.279 Although the Court recognized the full sweep of the Civil
War Amendment, the Court held that Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not reach private action.' ° The Court also found
that the Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery and
involuntary servitude and gave Congress the power to enforce its
provisions, did not concern "mere discrimination[] on account of race
or color [which] were not ... badges of slavery." 1  The Court
reasoned that the Civil War Amendments merely freed the slaves and
gave them the same status as free blacks in nonslave states.' Since
blacks were socially discriminated against in nonslave states, the
Thirteenth Amendment did not apply to social discriminations.'
In reaching its conclusions the Court rejected the notion that the Civil
War Amendments gave Congress general power to legislate in all
matters touching on civil rights, stating,
why should not Congress proceed at once to prescribe due
process of law for the protection of every one of these
fundamental rights, in every possible case, as well as to
prescribe equal privileges in inns, public conveyances, and
theatres? The truth is, that the implication of a power to
legislate in this manner is based upon the assumption that if
the States are forbidden to legislate or act in a particular
way on a particular subjects and power is conferred upon
Congress to enforce the prohibition, this gives Congress
power to legislate generally upon that subject, and not
merely power to provide modes of redress against such State
legislation or action. The assumption is certainly unsound.
It is repugnant to the Tenth Amendment of the Constitu-
tion, which declares that powers not delegated to the United
277. Id. at 346.
278. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
279. Id. at 25-26.
280. Id. at 24-25.
281. Id. at 25.
282. 1&
283. Id.
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States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively or to the people.'
The Civil Rights Cases, and the decision of Plessy v. Ferguson285
thirteen years later, ended any advancement in civil rights and their
enforcement lay dormant for nearly half a century. In arriving at its
"separate but equal" doctrine, Plessy relied on the rationale of the
Civil Rights Cases that the Civil War Amendments did not confer any
greater rights upon freed blacks than free blacks enjoyed in nonslave
states.
286
The holding in the Civil Rights Cases has not been formally
overruled despite criticism of its narrow interpretation of the Civil
War Amendments.' Despite the limitations created by the Civil
Rights Cases, and the Court's reluctance to apply the Fourteenth
Amendment to nonracial discriminations,' the Court's expansion
of Congress's Commerce Clause powers materially facilitated the
enactment of new civil rights legislation.
284. Id. at 14-15. In his dissent in the Civil Rights Cases, Justice Harlan reminded the
Court that in Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U.S. 485, 488-89 (1878), the Court, in striking down
Louisiana's public accommodation law, had opined that Congress had the exclusive right
under its Commerce Clause powers to legislate in this area. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S.
at 61 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
285. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
286. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544. In support the Court cited Roberts v. City of Boston, 5
Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1849) which approved separate schools for colored children.
287. In the "notorious Civil Right Cases ... the Court strangled Congress' efforts to use
its power to promote racial equality." Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
391 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
288. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872) (upholding the creation
of a state monopoly by distinguishing between the privileges and immunities of the citizens
of the United States and those of the citizens of the states, concluding that the Civil War
Amendments did not remove the states' power to regulate the personal and property rights
of their citizens); see also Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874) (holding that
women citizens cannot vote, which lead to the adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment).
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B. Civil Rights Enforcement and the Commerce Clause
In the first major civil rights legislation since the Reconstruction
days, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964289 pursuant to
both its Fourteenth Amendment and Commerce Clause powers.
In Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States' the Court sustained
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited private racial
discrimination in public accommodations. 291 In distinguishing the
Civil Rights Cases, the Court said:
Unlike Title II [the provision banning discrimination] of the
present legislation, the 1875 Act broadly proscribed discrimi-
nation in "inns, public conveyances on land or water,
theaters, and other places of public amusement," without
limiting the categories of affected businesses to those
impinging upon interstate commerce. In contrast, the
applicability of Title II is carefully limited to enterprises
having a direct and substantial relation to the interstate flow
of goods and people, except where state action is in-
volved.29
In addition, the Court pointed out that although the Civil Rights
Cases observed that "no one will contend that the power to pass it
was contained in the Constitution before the adoption of the last
three amendments (Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth [Amend-
ments])," the government did not rely on the Commerce Clause
power and, accordingly, the Court in the Civil Rights Cases excluded
the Commerce Clause as a possible source of power.293
In Katzenbach v. McClung' the companion case to Heart of
Atlanta, the Court upheld the 1964 Civil Rights Act's ban on racial
289. Pub. L. No. 88-352,78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of titles
28 and 42 U.S.C.). A modest civil rights act which included the creation of a Commission
on Civil Rights was enacted in 1957. Pub. L. No. 83-315, 71 Stat. 634 (codified at 28
U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1861; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-e, 1995 (1988 & Supp. V 1988)).
290. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
291. Id. at 257-62.
292. Id. at 250-51.
293. Id. at 251-52. The Court's reasoning was strained. In the late nineteenth century,
the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence narrowly construed congressional power in
the regulation of commerce. For example, in United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S.
1 (1895), the Court refused to apply the Sherman Antitrust Act to the establishment of a
near monopoly in the sugar industry. Justice Harlan, who dissented in the Civil Rights
Cases, also dissented in E. C. Knight. IdL at 18 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
294. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
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discrimination by restaurants, citing, in support, the broad range of
Commerce Clause powers recognized in United States v. Darby and
Wickard v. Filburn.295
The Civil Rights Cases' narrow reading of the Thirteenth
Amendment was implicitly repudiated by the Supreme Court in Jones
v. Mayer Co.291 The Jones Court upheld the validity of Section 1 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 9 which granted to all citizens the right
to own and lease real property.29 In discussing the Civil Rights
Cases, the Court said that, "whatever the present validity of the
position taken by the majority on that issue-[this] question [is]
rendered largely academic by Title II of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. 
299
Following the discussion of the Civil Rights Cases, the Jones
Court overruled the restrictive holding in Hodges v. United States,3"
that only conduct which actually enslaved a person could be subjected
to punishment under legislation enacted to enforce the Thirteenth
Amendment. 1
C. Modern Jurisprudence
Recent precedents emphasize that the Tenth Amendment places
no restriction on congressional power "to enforce the Civil War
Amendments by 'appropriate legislation.' ,0 In Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer"3 the Court explained that, since the Fourteenth Amendment
was adopted with the specific purpose of limiting state autonomy,
constitutional principles of federalism do not restrict congressional
power to invade state autonomy when Congress legislates under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment."° The Court explicitly
rejected the Tenth Amendment argument by holding that congressio-
nal power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is
295. Id. at 302-03 (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942); United States
v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 120-21 (1941)).
296. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
297. Ch. 31, §§ 1-10, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
298. Jones, 392 U.S. at 443.
299. Id. at 441 n.78.
300. 203 U.S. 1 (1906).
301. Jones, 392 U.S. at 443 n.78.
302. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980) (citing Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976)).
303. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
304. Id. at 453-56.
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broad.30 5 Moreover, in Katzenbach v. Morgan, °I the Court held
that Congress's enforcement power extends to the prohibition of state
action otherwise found constitutional by the Supreme Court.0 7 In
determining whether the congressional legislation was appropriate
under Congress's grant of power by the Constitution, the Court
employed the Commerce Clause test first announced in McCulloch v.
Maryland: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of
the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consistent
with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional."3 "8
By using an analogy to the application of the Necessary and
Proper Clause in the Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the Morgan
Court gave broad powers to Congress to enact laws under Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 Morgan upheld Section 4(e) of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 banning the use of a literacy test in
qualifying voters, 31 even though the Court previously upheld the
constitutionality of another literacy test.311 The Court used the
same reasoning in determining the validity of congressional legislation
enacted under Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment in South
Carolina v. Katzenbach.1 2
The Tenth Amendment, however, "was not ... repealed when
the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified; it was merely limited." '313
Congressional legislation under the Civil War Amendments, regulat-
ing the election of state officials, was struck down by the Court in
Oregon v. MitchelP4 as violative of the Tenth Amendment.315
Justice Black, in his opinion,316 after concluding that Congress has
the power to set the qualification for federal elections, said:
305. New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 67 (1980).
306. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
307. Id. at 648.
308. Id. at 650 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819)).
309. Id. at 650-51.
310. Id. at 646-47.
311. Id. at 649 (citing Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45
(1959)).
312. 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966).
313. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 259 (1983) (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
314. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
315. Id. at 124-25.
316. Justice Black's holding on the invalidity of the 18-year-old voting age requirement
for state elections was joined by the Chief Justice and three other Justices, constituting a
majority of the Court. Id. at 117.
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On the other hand, the Constitution was also intended to
preserve to the States the power that even the Colonies had
to establish and maintain their own separate and indepen-
dent governments, except insofar as the Constitution itself
commands otherwise. My Brother Harlan has persuasively
demonstrated that the Framers of the Constitution intended
the States to keep for themselves, as provided in the Tenth
Amendment, the power to regulate elections .... No funct-
ion is more essential to the separate and independent
existence of the States and their governments than the
power to determine within the limits of the Constitution the
qualifications of their own voters for state, county; and
municipal offices and the nature of their own machinery for
filling local public offices .... And the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was never intended
to destroy the States' power to govern themselves, making
the Nineteenth and Twenty-fourth Amendments superflu-
ous.
317
Mitchell invalidated the eighteen-year-old voting age eligibility
requirement of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as to state and local
elections?18 One year later, the Twenty-sixth Amendment was
adopted giving eighteen-year-olds the right to vote.319
V. CONCLUSION
The United States Constitution was drafted by people of diverse
beliefs. Its text, particularly the General Welfare language in the
Spending Clause, is susceptible to different interpretations. The
Tenth Amendment which was thought to ensure the protection of the
states' rights, is itself dependent on the interpretation of the original
Constitution because it refers to "[t]he powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution."3
Since the determination as to the powers delegated by the
Constitution to the United States is in the hands of the Supreme
Court, the Court has charted the path of the Tenth Amendment.
With the change in social and political landscape over the past two
317. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 124-26.
318. Id. at 123-26.
319. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
320. Id. amend. X.
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centuries, and the change of personalities on the Court, the path of
the Tenth Amendment has been unsteady and inconsistent.
The Commerce Clause of the Constitution, as it has been
interpreted by the Supreme Court over the years, unquestionably
established a strong national government. Today, congressional
legislation under the Commerce Clause power extends to virtually
every activity which affects commerce.
Under its Spending Clause power to provide for the general
welfare, with the grant of large sums of federal funds, Congress has
mandated states' compliance with its conditions in areas far removed
from its enumerated powers. Although congressional legislation
under this power was initially upheld because of the social and
economic emergencies occasioned by the Great Depression, the
Court's deference to congressional wisdom has resulted in pervasive
congressional regulation, through its Spending Clause powers, of areas
traditionally thought to be within the exclusive domain of state and
local governments.
The persecution of black citizens in the post-Reconstruction
period necessitated the enactment of vigorous national legislation,
which consequently infringed upon areas of states' rights.
The decline of states' rights and the corresponding growth of
national power is not only due to Supreme Court decisions, but is also
influenced by the attitudinal changes of the people caused by changes
in the social, economic, and political circumstances of the nation.
Over the years, demographic factors have reshaped the nation.
The industrialization of the nation and the mobility of the population
blurred and dulled the identity of state citizenship, making state
citizenship less important.32
Among the many changes, two cataclysmic events left their
indelible marks on the nation and the Constitution. The first was the
Civil War. Although the constitutionality of the Civil War was not
decided until it was over,3" the Civil War removed from the states
321. In the case of long-time overseas citizens, except for voting purposes, attachment
to a state is usually meaningless since only the national government can provide these
citizens with the benefits and protection of citizenship. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S.
36 (1872). "[A]II rights secured to our citizens by treaties with foreign nations, are
dependent upon citizenship of the United States and not citizenship of a state." Id. at 79-
80.
322. See Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1869) (stating that the union is
indissoluble because the Articles of Confederation declared it to be perpetual and "the
Constitution was ordained 'to form a more perfect Union' ")..
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the ultimate right of sovereignty-the choice to leave the Union and
become independent. The second event was the Great Depression,
which found the states incapable of solving the enormous social and
economic chaos it created.
Understandably, the states' inability to cope with the major social
and economic upheavals was the natural consequence of the adoption
of the Constitution, which removed certain basic attributes of
sovereignty from the states. For example, with freedom of travel, a
fundamental constitutional right of every citizen,3' and with the
federal government's plenary power over the immigration of
aliens,324 states are powerless to prevent the influx of people from
other states and foreign nations. Also, the Commerce Clause and the
prohibition against states laying imposts or duties severely restricted
the states' ability to regulate trade and commerce from within and
without the United States.'z Accordingly, their facilities and
resources often become overburdened. In such situations the affected
states and their people must look to the national government, with its
vast resources, to solve these problems. 6
Although the evolution towards a strong national government
was inevitable, 7 and the stronger national government has brought
prosperity and security to the people, the expansion of congressional
power, particularly in the spending area, has brought upon the nation
and its people the threat of a serious fiscal crisis and a large national
debt.32
The people created the United States "in Order to form a more
perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide
for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the
323. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-30 (1969).
324. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
325. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
326. The benefit of having a union of states is evident in times of great natural disasters
such as earthquakes, hurricanes, and floods. The use of federal disaster relief funds under
congressional Spending Clause power demonstrates the "sink or swim together" nature of
the union expounded by Justice Cardozo in Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 499 U.S. 511,
523 (1935).
327. The Supremacy Clause gives the federal government "a decided advantage in th[e]
delicate balance the Constitution strikes between State and Federal power." New York
v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2419 (1992) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
328. The national debt is close to five trillion dollars. See 31 U.S.C. § 3101 (Supp. V
1994).
November 1995] TRAVELLING DOWN THE UNSTEADY PATH 143
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity."3 29 The debate
over the Tenth Amendment brings into focus the fundamental
question concerning the future direction of the nation. Will the
continued growth of national power and corresponding erosion of
states' rights further these objectives? In deciding the validity of
congressional legislation against a Tenth Amendment challenge, this
question undoubtedly will weigh heavily on the minds of the Justices.
329. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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